curve, there remained choices to be made, essentially political choices, about the `best' combination of inflation and output. With a vertical Phillips curve, all that monetary policy could deliver in the medium and longer term was price stability. Moreover, periods of severe price instability, whether of high and variable inflation or of deflation, were inimical to growth. So the best that the monetary authorities could do in the medium and longer term for real growth is to achieve such stability; for the rest, issues relating to growth were not primarily in their province.
Such a single objective, price stability, meant that its achievement could now properly be delegated to an independent Central Bank, which could use its single instrument, control over the short-term interest rate, to achieve that objective.
There remain some, somewhat second-order, questions whether, having mandated the achievement of price stability to the Central Bank, the political authorities should go further and quantify more exactly in numerical terms what they mean by that, e.g. to hold the headline CPI number between 0 and 3% annual growth, or some such. My own belief is that reserving the exact definition of the inflation target to the political authorities is desirable; it enhances the democratic legitimacy, and the accountability and transparency of the continue to fix interest rates so as to achieve price stability?
The answer to that is that delegating the achievement of price stability to an independent Central Bank, with that objective specified in public and preferably in quantitative terms, is, as I shall argue, a commitment device. Why might we need a commitment mechanism? The standard answer to this is time inconsistency. A politician will promise to achieve price stability when she first comes into office, but as the next Elections come near, will be tempted to renege and generate a pre-election boom. Its a clever story, and appeals to the cynicism with which most people view politicians. But I am doubtful whether it is a true story. First, the lags in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy are so long, and the conduct of monetary policy, i.e. cutting interest rates, so obvious and transparent, that few would be fooled. People would see the forthcoming inflation, and so the exercise would be largely futile for the government anyhow. Second, the evidence, as collected by Alesina (1989) and others, does not confirm the existence of systematic, monetarily-driven, preelection booms.
My own view is that the cause of the politician's inflation bias is much more mundane. Because of the long lags in the monetary transmission process, interest rates should be set today in the light of the forecast balance of inflationary pressures some six, or more, quarters hence, when the effect of interest rates on inflation will be greatest. But future forecasts of inflation, output, etc., one or two years ahead are horribly uncertain and imprecise. No one knows with any certainty what should be done today to have an optimal effect on the economy a year, or two, in the future.
Meanwhile interest rate increases, and reductions in credit availability, are currently painful. Asset prices fall.
Exchange rates (usually) appreciate. The pain is felt most by certain concentrated, and politically powerful, groups, e.g. manufacturers, construction and property companies, homebuyers who have taken out mortgages. With uncertain forecasts, but the known political unpopularity of monetary tightening, politicians are likely to wait until there is present incontrovertible evidence of worsening inflation before they act; and because of those very same lags in the transmission mechanism, by the time they are prepared to act, it will be too late. With political control of monetary policy, `too little and too late' is likely to be the order of the day. In some countries, such as New Zealand and Canada, 1 I did so in my capacity as an external adviser to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in the run-up to the RBNZ Act of 1989. Then I had proposed (prior to the publication of Walsh's articles in that vein, (1995, a and b) that the Governor receive a bonus calibrated according to how closely the target was achieved. That proposal was eventually scuppered on presentational grounds, the N.Z. Treasury fearing that it might be claimed that the Governor was personally and financially benefiting from interest rate increases which would throw workers out of jobs. That objection could have been deflected by making proper use of the lags in the transmission process, i.e. any bonus to be earned by a decision-maker today should be calibrated on the inflation outcome two years hence, and any bonus payment deferred to that later date. Hence an interest rate increase now would not benefit the Governor until it had had its full subsequent effect on inflation, and could be shown ex post facto to have been appropriate. In any event there is no case known to me in which any pecuniary incentive scheme has been applied to the monetary authorities. Note, however, that, unless the greater part of one's trade is done with a single partner country, then linking one's currency to one other single currency will not resolve the problem, because there is then the risk of variations in the real value of that currency. In the UK's case, however, more than 50% of trade is now done with the euro-zone which is one reason why most of the tradeable good sector is keen on euroentry; if that proportion had been below, say, 30%, then the opposition to euro-entry would have been even more widespread.
There is, still, the possibility of trying to peg, or link, ones own currency to a trade-weighted basket of currencies, as was attempted for a time in Australia for example. But one problem with that is that it does not have the simplicity or transparency that a good nominal anchor should possess.
People will be cynical about the weighting process, and find it difficult to predict or understand the reasons for interest rate changes or other monetary policy measures. It will hardly serve to anchor expectations or to allow a simple, straightforward explanation of monetary policy measures.
The next problem that currency-linking involves is that the pegger has to accept whatever interest rates are set at the centre, and depending on constitutional circumstances the pegger may, or may not, have any part to play in setting such rates. As the saying goes, `One size has to fit all', but of course rarely does. But asymmetric shocks occur almost as much within countries as well as between countries. What is the glue that holds a within-country monetary union together, while making between-country monetary unions somewhat fragile?
My own answer to this is that countries normally enjoy both an internal political union and comity, augmented by a fiscal, or other, burden-sharing mechanism, that have been traditionally absent between countries, (but is in the process of construction, somewhat slowly and painfully, in Europe).
Essentially, if the maintenance of a pegged or linked currency involves domestic economic and political pain greater than the will of the people and of the politicians who represent them to bear, then that link will snap. Such a break-point depends on a host of circumstances, political and historical as well as economic, including the extent of domestic wage/price flexibility, the other options for monetary policy regimes that are available, etc. If the pain-barrier, or break-point, is perceived as low, then a currency peg will not be very credible. Moreover, standard measures to protect a currency, such as raising interest rates or raising taxes, may even turn out to be counter-productive beyond some, unknown, level since they will only make outside observers feel that the political break-point has been brought that much closer.
Circumstances -often as much political and historical as economic -lead to currency pegs, and links of various kinds, (ranging from complete unification, through currency boards down to pegged, but adjustable, exchange rates), facing The next option then is to make a judgment as to when (real) exchange rates have overshot, and then aim off on interest rates in response, at least temporarily. Given an ultimate tendency for the exchange rate to revert to equilibrium, this can even be interpreted as fully consistent with longer-run inflation (price level) targeting (see Cecchetti, et al, 2000) . Problems lie in assessing the extent of overshoot, the appearance of some favouritism to one (tradeable goods) sector of the economy, and a perception of some willingness to compromise with domestic targets. But at least one member of the UK's MPC has argued for such an approach.
If there are two, separate objectives, i.e. domestic price stability, and stable real exchange rates, (and I have argued that, while this should not have been so in theory, it often is in practice), then that naturally leads to a hunt for a second instrument. In this field two come to mind, sterilised intervention and exchange controls. Sterilised intervention is a relatively weak mechanism. The signal is obscure at best, (often indicating a desire for a different exchange rate but an unwillingness to take real actions to achieve that, i.e. it signals weakness, not strength), and the scale of portfolio adjustment usually tiny relative to the market.
Even so, if the scale of exchange rate disequilibrium is so large that the Central Bank is convinced that it can reap medium-term profits, then why should the authorities not themselves act as a profit-making long-term stabilising speculator? Too few other such speculators exist, and I cannot see why a Central Bank should sign a self-denying ordinance to abjure potential profitable and stabilising opportunities. The danger, instead, comes when a Central Bank is required to defend a (probably indefensible) pegged rate; not when it tries to intervene as a well-informed long-term speculator on an essentially floating rate. Against that it could be argued that Malaysia's example during the Asian crisis had no apparent knock-on effect on other countries' policies, perhaps because of the role of the IMF.
Moreover historical experience suggests that memories in international capital markets are (blessedly) short, so that the adverse effects on such markets of previous waves of controls, defaults, etc., have been quite limited in time.
(c) Other Asset Prices
Just as there may be structural, and other, reasons for giving more weight (in monetary decisions) to movements in the exchange rate than can be justified by its directly measured effect on future inflation, so the same argument can be used for a variety of other asset prices; two sets of assets are commonly considered in this respect, first housing and property, and second equity.
There are several arguments that can be used in this respect.
The first is that the standard, sticky-price extended The third argument, and perhaps the strongest, is that the extension of credit by financial intermediaries, and the profitability and stability of those same intermediaries, is intimately linked (e.g. via collateralisation) with the valuation of property, (and, but to a much lesser extent, with equities). The credit channel, analysed by Kiyotaki and Moore, Bernanke and Gertler, Minsky, and many others, depends largely on property valuation. So, a rise (fall) in property prices will have effects on expenditures, output and inflation that may not be exactly correlated with, or well measured by, the pure interest rate channel. Again, however, if the argument is that the workings of the credit channel is not adequately measured in standard forecasting models, then the first best solution is to improve the models.
But even if the models are improved to take appropriate account of the credit channel, (not an easy exercise), fluctuations in housing and property prices may cause similar fluctuations in financial conditions, notably in the stability of the banking system. One of the objectives/functions of a Central Bank is to maintain the systemic stability of the banking system. This is partly because of the linkages between financial development and output and growth (Levine et al, 2000) , and partly for its own sake. Volatility in asset, especially property, prices endangers that stability.
Examples are numerous and obvious.
The question is how to respond, especially when an asset price boom coincides with stable current goods and services prices. Bernanke and Gertler (2000) advocate doing so only in so far as asset price movements now will affect future forecast goods and services prices; Cecchetti et al (2000) would have monetary policy aim off by more. We already rehearsed this when discussing exchange rates.
One point that needs further consideration in this context is the potential availability of other instruments; here I am thinking of prudential requirements. In practice, however, such prudential requirements usually have the effect of amplifying, rather than restraining, macro-economic cycles.
Capital adequacy is rarely a problem when an asset boom expands profitability and balance sheet values, while limiting bad debts. Falls in asset values weaken (bank) balance sheets, so prudential requirements tend to reinforce bank reluctance to lend during deflationary downturns.
Can anything be done about this, especially during the preceding asset boom? One of the problems, (as with exchange rates), is identifying the (unsustainable) deviation from fundamental equilibrium. Given the difficulty of doing so, and the strength of special interest lobbying, it is hard to raise the level of prudential requirements, e.g. capital adequacy ratios, minimum loan margins, etc., when asset prices are high. One proposal, which I think has some merit, is to tie changes in prudential requirements to the change in (some index of) asset prices over some preceding period. For example, suppose that housing and property prices grow normally by 2% more than retail prices; then each quarter one could change the required margin on housing loans by X, where
where Y is the annualised growth in housing prices, and _ is the rate of growth of RPI.
What that brings me on towards, rather neatly, is the putative role of the Central Bank in supervision and regulation. Because of the lags in the transmission mechanism, the appropriate target is an inflation forecast. Because forecasts are always uncertain and subject to unforeseen shocks, inflation can never be controlled perfectly. But it can be held at the desired rate on average. (c) Can we simultaneously achieve, and maintain, internal and external price stability?
The extraordinary volatility of real exchange rates has been, perhaps, the greatest macro-economic puzzle of our age. There are no good theoretical reasons, nor empirical explanations, of why it has occurred. So long as it continues, it will present a problem to all but the largest economies. Whatever the argument for capital controls in times of crisis, they would be neither feasible nor desirable as a longer run solution to this problem. I have argued that a major cause of such volatility is an unfortunate absence of stabilising speculators; so any measure that further penalises speculators could just as easily worsen volatility.
A combination of continuing volatility in real exchange rates, (combined with a growing ease of undertaking e-commerce in any currency at any time with any counter-party), could lead to a growing pressure for the greater use of a regional currency.
South America, as well as North, may become even more explicitly a dollar area, while Europe and Africa adopt the euro. Asia presents more of a problem in this respect. One super-power temporarily fallen on hard times, and two emerging giants, can neither fall in behind a single hegemon, as in the Americas, nor benefit from a rapprochement, such as achieved by France and Germany. The future of international monetary policy in Asia looks, at least from a distance, particularly opaque.
